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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal prosecutors often present laboratory reports as crucial pieces of
evidence.1  Overturning ninety years of precedent, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts mandates that prosecutors may no
longer introduce scientific analysis as evidence without live testimony from the
producing laboratory analyst.2  Prior to this decision, prosecutors were able to
introduce scientific evidence into evidence against a defendant without furnish-
ing the analyst who conducted the laboratory analysis as a “witness” because
scientific affidavits were not categorically deemed to be testimonial.3  Regard-
less of whether one agrees with the outcome of Melendez-Diaz, the Court has
made its ruling and prosecutors must now amend the process by which they
bring laboratory evidence to trial.4  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment protects the right of a criminal defendant to confront adverse wit-
nesses, and the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts further
defines the scope of the Confrontation Clause.5  Specifically, the Supreme
Court held that certificates of analysis are affidavits, and analysts themselves
are not beyond the coverage of the Confrontation Clause.6  The decision swept
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1 See Brief of Amici Curiae The National District Attorneys Ass’n, & District, Prosecuting,
& County Attorneys in Support of Respondent at 10-11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591) [hereinafter Attorneys Ass’n Amici Brief].
2 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 2542 (majority opinion) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004))
(explaining that scientific affidavits are in fact testimonial under the application of Crawford
v. Washington, a case that addressed whether evidence is testimonial in nature).
4 See id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Until today, scientific analysis could be intro-
duced into evidence without testimony from the ‘analyst’ who produced it.”).
5 Id. at 2531 (majority opinion).
6 Id. at 2532-34.
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away an evidentiary practice that extended across thirty-five states and six fed-
eral appellate courts.7  In turn, many prosecutors now face the dilemma of
obtaining the resources required to comply with this ruling without sacrificing
justice.8  As the four dissenting Justices cautioned, requiring live analyst testi-
mony for the admission of laboratory reports might pose a crushing burden for
the prosecution that “[g]uilty defendants will go free, on the most technical
grounds.”9
Under Melendez-Diaz, the restrictions on using laboratory reports have a
wide and all-encompassing reach that have created new obstacles for prosecu-
tors when presenting evidence in cases involving scientific analysis.10  An ana-
lyst must present live testimony to confirm a report involving scientific
analysis, regardless of the type of laboratory report offered as evidence.11
Although the Court justifiably adheres to protecting a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him,12 the decision nonetheless
presents prosecutors with logistical and financial hurdles.13  It increases the
need for more analysts because instead of solely performing testing and analy-
sis in laboratories, analysts must now spend time traveling to court to testify
regarding their analysis.14  Prosecutors must find a way to meet the require-
ments of Melendez-Diaz using the resources available to them without impair-
ing the success of the criminal justice system.  Notably, Melendez-Diaz does
not offer any guidance for implementation of its ruling, but merely asserts that
live analyst testimony is required for the admission of laboratory reports.15
This Note seeks a solution to the prosecutors’ dilemma so that they may
continue to perform their jobs efficiently, while not overstepping the bounda-
ries of the Confrontation Clause.  Specifically, this Note proposes the use of
videoconferencing technology for analysts’ testimony when offering evidence
based on a particular type of forensic science known as “chemical analysis” for
controlled substances.  Affidavits prepared by analysts for chemical analysis on
substances reflect “objective or neutral facts” that do not directly accuse a
defendant of any wrongdoing, but merely confirm or deny the presence of a
given substance being submitted into evidence.16  For example, an analyst may
confirm that a white powdery substance is an illegal substance such as cocaine,
or a legal substance such as talcum powder.  However, an analyst does not
testify that a defendant was found to be carrying or transporting the substance,
7 Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8 See Rebecca Waters, Supreme Court Requires Lab Analysts to Testify: Now What?,
FORENSIC MAG. (July 24, 2009), http://www.forensicmag.com/news/supreme-court-requires-
lab-analysts-testify-now-what-0.
9 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10 See Waters, supra note 8.
11 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
12 Id. at 2531.
13 See Waters, supra note 8.
14 See infra notes 113-21.
15 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
16 Brief for Respondent at 16-17, 23, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591).
Although the Court rejected the assertion that “neutral scientific testing” is truly neutral and
concluded that affidavits must be subject to analysts’ testimony, this Note asserts that live
two-way videoconferencing is sufficient for providing the testimony that the Court requires
for this type of scientific analysis. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
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and thus, the analyst presents a “neutral” analysis in his or her testimony.
Although usage of two-way live video testimony will not allow prosecutors to
return to the practice they have used for the last century and will not encompass
all laboratory reports, it will provide a more viable method for prosecutors to
utilize a large amount of laboratory reports without draining resources.17
Part II explores the background and purpose of the Confrontation Clause,
including the Supreme Court’s stance on the use of one-way live video testi-
mony and further examines the holding in Melendez-Diaz.  Part III analyzes the
propriety of using two-way live video testimony for analyst testimony to cor-
roborate reports involving chemical analysis.  Finally, Part IV concludes that
the usage of two-way live video testimony for scientifically neutral laboratory
reports will reconcile Melendez-Diaz with the prosecutors’ dilemma.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”18  When the framers of the United States Constitution ratified the Bill of
Rights in 1791, they included the Sixth Amendment in order to give an accused
the right to confront his accuser at trial.19  However, while the Sixth Amend-
ment requires access to confrontation, it does not expressly call for physical
confrontation.20  In turn, the legal system has continuously called for the
Supreme Court to delineate the requirements and limitations of the Confronta-
tion Clause.21
The Court has often construed the Confrontation Clause to require physi-
cal, face-to-face confrontation,22 but has also found that the right to confronta-
tion is not absolute.23  In an early interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
the Supreme Court assessed whether a trial court had violated a defendant’s
right to confront his accusers by admitting the prior testimony of two deceased
witnesses.24  Because the deceased witnesses gave their respective testimony at
a prior trial, the Court found that the admissions of the testimonies to the sec-
ond trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.25  The Court emphasized
17 This Note proposes that live two-way videoconferencing should be used for analysts’
testimony regarding chemical analysis in federal courts, as well as in states that have yet to
adopt legislation that would allow for videoconferencing.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) (stating that the text of the Confron-
tation Clause reflects a purpose to eliminate use of ex parte examinations); Cathleen J.
Cinella, Note, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation—United States v.
Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 138 (1998).
20 Cinella, supra note 19, at 141.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 19-69.
22 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (stating that the Confrontation Clause
grants a right to meet face-to-face); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (stating
that a defendant has “the right physically to face those who testify against him”).
23 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
24 Id. at 237-38.
25 Id. at 240-43.
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that “general rules of law . . . must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case.”26
Under this decree, the Court has considered several circumstances in
which face-to-face confrontation might not be required at a criminal trial.27
Over time, the Court has created guidelines to determine whether the Confron-
tation Clause has been violated, including the Crawford test for testimonial
statements, and the Craig test for one-way live videoconferencing testimony.28
1. The Crawford Test for the Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court created a test to determine
whether out-of-court testimony may be admissible in court.29  There, the defen-
dant was charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing a man who
allegedly tried to rape the defendant’s wife.30  The defendant argued that he
acted in self-defense, but his wife’s recorded police statement contradicted his
story.31  A state marital privilege statute provided that spouses could not be
compelled to testify against each other, and, thus, the defendant’s wife did not
testify at trial.32  Nevertheless, the trial court allowed the prosecution to intro-
duce the wife’s recorded statement as evidence.33  The defendant was con-
victed and, on appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of the statement
violated his Sixth Amendment rights.34  The Court agreed and reversed the
conviction.35
Crawford overturned Ohio v. Roberts,36 which had been the controlling
law for twenty-four years.  The Roberts test for the admissibility of out-of-
court statements was based on reliability, rather than the testimonial nature of
the statement.37  Turning away from the reliability test, the Court set forth a
category of “testimonial” hearsay.38  However, the Court declined to establish
an overarching definition of “testimonial,” and reserved that task for another
time.39
Instead, the Court created a two-prong test to determine whether an out-of-
court statement is considered “testimonial”: (1) a witness must be unavailable
because he or she refuses or is unable to testify, and the court cannot compel
26 Id. at 243.
27 See Christine L. Olson, Comment, Accusation from Abroad: Testimony of Unavailable
Witnesses Via Live Two-Way Videoconferencing Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1671, 1676-77 (2008).
28 Id. at 1679-85.
29 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 71 (2004).
30 Id. at 38-40.
31 Id.  The wife stated to police that the victim did not have anything in his hands when the
defendant stabbed him, indicating that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
32 Id. at 40-42.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 68-69.
36 Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
37 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
38 Id. at 68.
39 Id.
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that witness to testify at trial;40 and (2) the unavailable witness’s testimony is
only admissible if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.41  In Crawford, the wife’s statement satisfied the first prong, but did
not pass the second prong for admissibility.42  The Court placed great emphasis
on a defendant’s right to cross-examine his accusers and indicated that a defen-
dant’s right to cross-examine a witness is essential for upholding the Confron-
tation Clause.43
2. The Craig Test for the Admissibility of One-Way Live Video
Testimony
The Supreme Court has also addressed whether an alternative form of tes-
timony, one-way live videoconferencing, may be admissible as an exception to
face-to-face confrontation, but only with regard to child sexual abuse cases.44
In Coy v. Iowa, the trial court allowed prosecutors to place a screen between
child victims and the defendant who was charged with molesting them.45  The
screen prevented the children from seeing the defendant as they testified, and
the defendant could only faintly see the children through the screen.46  The
defendant was convicted of sexual assault, and he argued on appeal that the use
of the screen deprived him of his right to face adverse witnesses.47
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia pointed out the importance of
physical confrontation because “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a
person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’”48  Moreover, the pressure of testi-
fying in the defendant’s presence reduces the likelihood that a witness will lie
while testifying,49 and the trier of fact can better observe the witness’s
demeanor.50  Accordingly, the Court held that the use of the screen violated the
Confrontation Clause.51
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor laid the groundwork for using
one-way live videoconferencing as an alternative form of testimony.52  While
40 Id. at 68.  A witness is also unavailable if the witness invokes a privilege not to testify.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
42 See id. at 40.
43 Id. at 43-51.
44 See infra text accompanying notes 56-69.
45 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014-15 (1988).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1015.
48 Id. at 1019.
49 See id. (“A witness ‘may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at
the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts.  He can now under-
stand what sort of human being that man is.’”) (quoting Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF
LIBERTY 35 (1956)).
50 See id. (“The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes
upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own
conclusions.”).
51 Id. at 1022.
52 Id. at 1025 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 858
(1990) (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1025 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (addressing the use of
live video testimony for child sexual abuse cases, stating that a “case-specific finding of
necessity” may create an exception in the Confrontation Clause to protect child witnesses.
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Justice O’Connor agreed that the use of a screen violated the Confrontation
Clause in Coy’s case, she suggested that in a different case, it might be appro-
priate to use “certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from
the trauma of courtroom testimony.”53  Justice O’Connor specifically men-
tioned that child abuse cases might warrant the use of one-way or two-way
closed-circuit television because the child witness’ testimony would be
presented live, in the defendant’s presence.54
Two years after Coy, Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in
Maryland v. Craig, a case that recognized the use of closed-circuit television to
admit a child victim’s testimony in sexual abuse cases.55  There, the defendant
was charged with sexually abusing a child, and the Court permitted the child
victim to testify via one-way closed-circuit television.56  The defendant was
convicted and, on appeal, the defendant claimed she was not afforded her right
to confrontation.57
Unlike Coy, the Craig Court found the state’s interest in protecting a child
victim warranted the use of the one-way closed-circuit television.58  The Court
emphasized that the four crucial requirements of the Confrontation Clause are:
(1) the personal examination of the witness; (2) the witness’s submission to
giving statements under oath; (3) the opportunity to cross-examine the witness;
and (4) the ability of the jury to observe the witness in order to determine
credibility.59
The Court created another two-prong test for determining whether actual
in-person confrontation is required under the Confrontation Clause:60  (1) the
denial of physical confrontation must be necessary to further an important pub-
lic policy,61 and (2) the testimony admitted must be sufficiently reliable.62
Accordingly, the Court found that the use of one-way video testimony passed
both prongs of the test because protecting a child witness in a sexual abuse case
supported public policy, and the child’s testimony was reliable because the
defendant’s counsel was able to cross-examine the child before an observing
jury.63
In a strong dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the waiver of face-to-face
confrontation only applied to hearsay evidence for “unavailable” declarants,
and child witnesses did not qualify.64  Justice Scalia further criticized the
majority’s decision because it allowed an “available” witness to appear at trial
53 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 1023-25.
55 Craig, 497 U.S at 840.
56 See id. at 840-41 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (West
1989)).  Before allowing the procedure, the trial judge must determine that the child witness
will suffer from severe emotional distress if required to testify in front of the defendant.
57 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 843.
58 Id. at 853.
59 Id. at 845-46.
60 Id. at 850.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 851-52.  Notably, Craig was decided prior to Crawford, and, thus, it is unclear how
the Craig test applies post-Crawford because Craig was decided using the reliability test.
64 Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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without facing confrontation.65  Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
right to confront a witness at trial is not absolute, he argued that the Court
should impart greater deference to the plain language of the Confrontation
Clause, which guarantees face-to-face confrontation.66  Additionally, Justice
Scalia maintained that although protecting a child victim is an important state
interest, it bears no more weight than what the state’s interest would be in
obtaining a guilty conviction in any other criminal proceeding.67
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Melendez-Diaz
In June 2009, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts caused great alarm for many prosecutors.68  In that decision, the Court
held that the Confrontation Clause mandates live testimony from lab analysts in
order to admit laboratory reports into evidence.69  The Court maintained that
mandating analysts’ testimony in court would allow for the discovery of defects
in laboratory reports, and the Court supported its decision by citing to a study
conducted by the National Academy of Sciences that placed doubt on the accu-
racy of forensic science.70
In Melendez-Diaz, the state trial court convicted the defendant on charges
of distributing and trafficking cocaine.71  The Massachusetts Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court did not err by admitting certifi-
cates of analysis from a state laboratory, even in the absence of in-court testi-
mony by analysts.72  On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
defendant contended that admission of the certificates of analysis violated his
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.73  The State
presented four defenses for its use of analyst reports.74  First, the State argued
that analysts were not subject to confrontation because they were not “accusa-
tory” witnesses who directly accuse the defendant of any wrongdoing.75  Sec-
ond, the State asserted that it did not request laboratory analysts to testify
regarding an event that occurred in the past, but, rather, to report “near-contem-
poraneous observations.”76  Third, the State claimed that analysts did not
observe any crime, and did not provide statements in response to interroga-
tion.77  Determining whether a statement is testimonial must be based on the
65 Id.
66 Id. at 863-64 (arguing that the majority misconstrued precedent to create this exception to
the Confrontation Clause).
67 Id. at 867.
68 See Tom Jackman, Va. Rushes to Address Ruling on Analysts; Drug-Case Demands Have
Strained State Lab, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/17/AR2009081702302.html.
69 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2536-37.
71 Id. at 2530-31.
72 Id. at 2531.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied review of the case.
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (2007).
73 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
74 See infra notes 75-79.
75 Id. at 2533.
76 Id. at 2535.
77 Id.
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context in which the statement was made, and an affidavit that “merely attest[s]
to the chemical composition and weight of physical evidence . . . do[es] not
directly accuse anyone of any criminal conduct.”78  Finally, the State argued
that the analysts’ affidavits were “akin to the types of official and business
records admissible at common law.”79
Tightening the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme
Court rejected the State’s arguments and found that laboratory analysts did not
constitute a category of witnesses that would be “immune from confronta-
tion.”80  The Court maintained that laboratory reports completed almost a week
before the analysts’ affidavits were not near contemporaneous,81 and that
forensic evidence was nonetheless subject to manipulation.82  Citing the
National Academy of Sciences study, the Court asserted that “neutral scientific
testing” is not entirely neutral or reliable.83  Specifically, the Court explained
that because forensic scientists are often given a specific question to answer in
relation to a case, the scientist might feel pressured to “sacrifice appropriate
methodology for the sake of expediency.”84  Furthermore, the Court established
that the analysts’ affidavits were unlike admissible business records because the
affidavits were not kept as a regular course of business, but, rather, were pro-
duced as evidence to be submitted at trial.85  Finally, the Court noted that
requiring laboratory analysts to confront a defendant face-to-face would curtail
the submission of fraudulent and incompetent analysis.86  The Court did
acknowledge that its decision will further burden the prosecution,87 but stressed
that the “sky will not fall,” as proven by the states that have already adopted
rules that bar admission of a forensic analyst’s report without live testimony.88
Four justices, however, maintained that the Court misconstrued the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause with regard to scientific evidence.89
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy accused the majority of basing its
decision on two cases that do not address forensic analysts.90  The dissent
argued that current procedures already preclude the admission of faulty evi-
dence, and predicted that the Court’s holding would be greatly disruptive to
criminal procedure.91
78 Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 16-17.
79 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Id. at 2534.
81 Id. at 2535.
82 Id. at 2536.
83 Id.
84 Id. (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 183 (2009) [hereinafter
NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT]).
85 Id. at 2538.
86 Id. at 2537 (referencing the Brief for National Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae at
15-17, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, in which “drylabbing”—where analysts falsely
report test results when no actual tests were performed—is discussed).
87 Id. at 2540.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2543.
90 Id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority relies on Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)).
91 Id. at 2544.
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One of the primary problems with the Court’s decision, according to the
dissent, is that although the Court demands the live testimony of the “analyst,”
it is difficult to determine which person this rule applies to because many peo-
ple are involved in producing a laboratory report.92  In considering the process,
the dissent listed four people that may play a role in producing a report and
may contribute to the final test result: (1) an analyst who prepares a sample of
the drug, places it in a testing machine, and retrieves the results; (2) an analyst
who interprets the results; (3) an analyst who calibrates the testing machine and
certifies the machine is in good working order; and (4) an analyst who is likely
a director that certifies that the others followed proper procedures.93  Even if it
were assumed that the “analyst” required to testify in court is the person who
interprets the results, the dissent noted that the Confrontation Clause was not
designed to detect errors in forensic reports.94  The dissent further reasoned that
it is unlikely a laboratory analyst would retract a prior conclusion of the test
results from simply catching sight of a defendant.95  Moreover, if a defendant
truly believes a report to be flawed, the defendant can either call in an expert
witness or subpoena the original analyst to appear in court.96
The dissent also considered the logistical and financial burden imposed on
the prosecution.97  It maintained that because busy trial courts must accommo-
date the schedules of attorneys, witnesses, and juries, a laboratory analyst will
likely not be a priority and may wait for days before testifying in court.98  Fur-
thermore, the dissent indicated that the number of cases that will require labora-
tory analysts to testify will reach astounding numbers, which will ultimately
abate taxpayer dollars by exhausting financial resources, or result in the wrong-
ful exoneration of guilty defendants.99  In particular, if for some reason an ana-
lyst is unable to testify in court, the defense will catch a “windfall” because
courts can no longer admit the laboratory report as evidence.100
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2544-45.
94 Id. at 2547.
95 Id. at 2548.
96 Id. at 2547.
97 Id. at 2549.
98 Id.  The dissent points out,
Trial courts have huge caseloads to be processed within strict time limits.  Some cases may
unexpectedly plead out at the last minute; others, just as unexpectedly, may not.  Some juries
stay out longer than predicted; others must be reconstituted.  An analyst cannot hope to be the
trial court’s top priority in scheduling.  The analyst must instead face the prospect of waiting for
days in a hallway outside the courtroom before being called to offer testimony that will consist of
little more than a rote recital of the written report.
Id.
99 See id. at 2549-50.  The dissent surmises that if the district attorney in Philadelphia prose-
cutes 25,000 drug crimes in a year, and 95 percent of the cases end in plea bargain, then each
of the city’s eighteen drug analysts will testify in at least sixty-nine trials in a year.  Id. at
2550.  Also, if the district attorney in Cleveland prosecutes 14,000 drug crimes in a year, and
95 percent of the cases end in plea bargain, then each of the city’s six drug analysts will
testify in 117 cases in a year. Id.
100 Id. at 2556-57.
802 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:793
Finally, the dissent argued that the Court’s holding contradicted the
authority of thirty-five states and six federal appellate courts.101  It is the role of
state legislatures, and not the Court, to establish rules of evidence.  The dissent
also noted that the Court should not rely on the National Academy of Sciences’
report because the objective of the research council was to inform Congress of
their findings, and not to advise the Supreme Court.102  In Justice Kennedy’s
eyes, the majority’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause “transforms . . .
a sensible procedural protection into a distortion of the criminal justice
system.”103
Melendez-Diaz divided the Court, resulting in a 5-4 split decision favoring
the petitioner.  In the wake of the Court’s decision, prosecutors around the
country braced themselves in anticipation of the possible ramifications.104
III. THE PROPRIETY OF USING TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY TO
AMELIORATE THE PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA
Although Craig addresses the use of one-way video testimony, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the use of two-way video testimony.105
Two-way video testimony enables parties at both ends of the circuits to hear
and see each other instantaneously.106  Federal courts diverge on whether to
allow the use of two-way video testimony and under what circumstances such
testimony should be admissible.107  Proponents of using two-way video testi-
mony argue that the procedure is akin to physical testimony in that it allows for
face-to-face confrontation, cross-examination, and observation by the jury,
court, defense counsel, and the defendant.108  Opponents of the use of two-way
video testimony find that the procedure does not furnish physical face-to-face
confrontation, and that courts should only apply the Crawford test for state-
ments made prior to trial, as opposed to statements presented at trial.109  Oppo-
101 Id. at 2554.
102 Id.  The dissent believes the Court should not act in the place of Congress, and it is
Congress that must determine “whether scientific tests are unreliable and, if so, whether
testimony is the proper solution to the problem.” Id.
103 Id. at 2548.
104 See Waters, supra note 8.
105 See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006).  The 11th circuit cites
its own precedent, along with four other circuits, for using the Craig test to analyze two-way
video testimony even though Craig addresses one-way video testimony.
106 See Aaron Harmon, Recent Development, Child Testimony Via Two-Way Closed Circuit
Television: A New Perspective on Maryland v. Craig in United States v. Turning Bear and
United States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 157, 161 (2005).
107 See Yates, 438 F.3d at 1315 (finding that usage of two-way video for testimony of
unavailable international witness violates Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bordeaux,
400 F.3d 548, 554-55 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to follow Gigante, stating that confrontation
over two-way videoconferencing is not the constitutional equivalent of face-to-face confron-
tation); Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding the use of the
Craig test in finding that that use of video testimony was constitutional); United States v.
Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that admission of testimony from a bed-
ridden, unavailable witness via two-way videoconferencing does not violate Confrontation
Clause);
108 See Gigante, 166 F.3d at 80.
109 See Yates, 438 F.3d at 1314 n.4.
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nents believe that confrontation through electronic means is simply not the
same as physical testimony as required by the Constitution, and thus, com-
promises the Sixth Amendment.110
However, the text of the Confrontation Clause does not specify “face-to-
face” or “physical” testimony.111  Rather, it merely assures a defendant the
“right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”112  Live two-way
videoconferencing fulfills the demands on the Confrontation Clause because
the defendant is, in fact, afforded an opportunity to confront an accusatory wit-
ness who is adverse to his case, and the defense is able to cross-examine the
witness in pursuit of the truth.
Part A of this section describes the difficulties prosecutors have encoun-
tered since the Court issued its requirement for analysts’ testimony in
Melendez-Diaz.  Part B analyzes the propriety of using live two-way videocon-
ferencing for analysts’ testimony from a scientific frame of reference, and Part
C discusses current usage of live two-way videoconferencing and the issues
involved with its use.  Part D explains why the use of two-way live video for
analysts’ testimony regarding chemical analysis meets the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.
A. The Prosecutors’ Dilemma
With mounting budgetary restrictions and limitations on resources, prose-
cutors have become frustrated in attempting to comply with Melendez-Diaz.113
The increased demand for analyst testimony has been staggering and will likely
continue to burden prosecutors.114  Following the Melendez-Diaz decision,
Scott Burns, executive director of the National District Attorneys Association,
stated, “It’s a train wreck.  To now require that criminalists in offices and labs
that are already burdened and in states where budgets are already being cut
back, to travel to courtrooms and wait to say that cocaine is cocaine—we’re
still kind of reeling from this decision.”115
Prosecutors find themselves in a difficult position when attempting to
comply with the requirements of Melendez-Diaz because many forensic labora-
tories that perform chemical analysis are substantially understaffed.116  In a
brief to the Court regarding the Melendez-Diaz case, the amici National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association maintained that in consideration of the significant
number of chemical analysis tests performed each year, a court appearance
from each lab analyst who has performed chemical analysis for a case would be
“physically impossible.”117  Specifically, the brief cites staffing levels and
budgetary restrictions as reasons that it would be unlikely for analysts to be
able to testify in all cases involving chemical analysis.118
110 Id. at 1315.
111 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 See Waters, supra note 8.
114 See Jackman, supra note 68.
115 Waters, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 Attorneys Ass’n Amici Brief, supra note 1, at 12-14.
117 Id. at 10.
118 Id. at 19.
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For example, in Clark County, Nevada, analysts perform testing on all
recovered illegal substances at the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Forensic Laboratory.119  In 2007, the laboratory received 2,205 requests for
chemical analysis, and employed four full-time lab analysts who performed
analyses on 2,251 cases, where many cases required analysis for more than one
item.120  However, with a sharp rise of methamphetamine use in the southwest-
ern region of the United States, the laboratory received 2,973 requests in the
first eight months of 2008 alone.121  Despite the rising number of cases involv-
ing illegal narcotics, and, consequently, requests for chemical analysis, the lab
was still only able to employ 4.5 full-time analysts in 2008.122  The Melendez-
Diaz ruling has only exacerbated the budgetary dilemmas that prosecutors were
coping with prior to the Court’s decision.
In Las Vegas, Nevada, prosecutors are concerned with the increasing num-
ber of cases where a person is driving under the influence of sleep medica-
tions.123  The laboratory in Las Vegas tests for six primary chemical
substances, but does not test for the substance used in sleep medications, and
neither do any laboratories in nearby cities or states.124  To perform chemical
analysis in order to test for sleep medication, the prosecutors’ office must use a
laboratory in Pennsylvania, one of the few laboratories in the country that will
test for the substance.125  Under Melendez-Diaz, if the prosecutor’s office in
Las Vegas chooses to prosecute a suspect for driving under the influence of
sleep medications, the City of Las Vegas must spend the time and money to
transport a laboratory analyst from the other side of the country to testify in a
case.126  Consequently, the financial and logistical issues surrounding live ana-
lyst testimony are unduly burdensome for the prosecution.
The amici National District Attorneys Association also maintained that
requiring live testimony from analysts for every drug-related case would create
delays in the criminal justice system of most jurisdictions.127  The amici noted
that courts often have such lengthy dockets that cases might not proceed on the
scheduled date and could be rescheduled as many as four times.128  By
demanding that an analyst must testify in court at these cases, courts would
require the analyst to wait for many hours only to see if a case actually pro-
ceeds to trial.129  If the case is rescheduled, the analyst would have to appear
again and again until it is time for the case to proceed.130  While these analysts
are waiting to testify at court, the delay creates a backlog for substances waiting
119 Id. at 14.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Interview with Benard Little, Assistant City Attorney, Las Vegas, in Las Vegas, Nev.
(Sept. 10, 2009) (on file with author).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Attorneys Ass’n Amici Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
128 Id. at 15-16.
129 Id. at 16.
130 Id.
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to be tested for cases.131  Additionally, analysts who have performed many
chemical tests for different cases may be required to testify in multiple courts
on the same day.132  If the analyst is unable to provide law enforcement with
test results in a timely fashion, or is unable to appear in certain courts due to
scheduling in other courts, then the prosecution bears the risk of violating the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial.133
At the federal level, as the dissent noted in Melendez-Diaz, the Court’s
decision poses even greater obstacles for federal prosecutors due to the federal
government’s widespread operations.134  The Federal Bureau of Investigation
laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, performs more than one million chemical
analyses per year, and under Melendez-Diaz, an analyst must travel to various
locations to testify in every case for which he performed a chemical analysis.135
Finally, prosecutors assert that the cost to society will be grave if analysts
are required to testify at all trials to corroborate laboratory reports.136  Illegal
narcotics usage is a prevalent problem in American society,137 and the eco-
nomic expenditure for illegal substance abuse in 2002 totaled $180.9 billion.138
Substance abuse is also one of the most expensive health-related ailments in the
United States, with the healthcare-related cost for illegal substance abuse total-
ing approximately $16 billion in 2002.139  The community holds a great interest
in curbing the availability and distribution of illegal narcotics,140 as it affects
various facets of society, from educational to economic functions.141  However,
prosecutors believe that if analysts are required to testify for every narcotics
case that the government brings forth, the already-difficult process of battling
illegal substance usage will force illegal narcotics prosecution to “face an insur-
mountable hurdle and come to a halt.”142
The post-Melendez-Diaz experience in at least one state suggests that
prosecutors’ concerns might be justified.  Although supporters of Melendez-
Diaz believed that the encumbrance on prosecutors would be minimal due to
the availability of other options, such as stipulations143 and notice-and-demand
statutes,144 the numbers have revealed a negative resulting effect on prosecu-
tors.145  For example, in July 2009, just one month after the Melendez-Diaz
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
135 Id. (citations omitted).
136 See Attorneys Ass’n Amici Brief, supra note 1, at 27.
137 Id. at 20.
138 Id. at 21.
139 Id. at 22.
140 Id. at 20.
141 See id. at 24-25.
142 Id. at 27.
143 Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591).
144 Statutes that allow prosecutors to service defendants’ notices of intent to offer forensic
testimony without cross-examination, and give defendants the right to demand cross-exami-
nation. Id. at 13.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
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ruling, defense attorneys in the state of Virginia subpoenaed drug analysts in
925 instances; in July 2008, the defense only called for analysts forty-three
times.146  Additionally, in July 2009, analysts in Virginia spent 369 hours trav-
eling to courthouses and testifying in court; in the previous eleven months,
analysts spent a cumulative total of 230 hours for traveling and testifying.147  A
DUI case was even reduced to a mere reckless driving conviction because an
analyst was unable to testify at trial to allow laboratory reports into evi-
dence.148  Legislators in Virginia admitted that the ultimate problem was sim-
ply a lack of resources—namely, the need for more analysts who are able to
conduct lab work and spend time testifying in court.149
B. A Scientific Perspective
Understanding the scientific basis for requiring analyst testimony is cru-
cial in assessing the use of live two-way videoconferencing.  This section
reveals how the usage of live two-way videoconferencing is commensurate
with scientific concerns regarding analyst testimony for chemical analysis.  In
particular, this section introduces findings in the field of forensic science with
regard to chemical analysis, and then delves into issues that must be resolved
by the forensic science field, rather than imputed upon the legal community.
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, is a
200-page report about the challenges of forensic science, produced by the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and commissioned by Congress.150  In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court drew on several of the NAS research council’s find-
ings in making the decision to require analysts’ testimony in court for the
admission of laboratory reports.151  In the NAS report, the research council
assessed the admission of forensic science evidence in litigation.152  It detailed
the methodology of different fields of forensic science,153 and described the
limitations of utilizing such evidence at trial.154  Specifically, the report main-
tains that the admission of forensic evidence in criminal trials should rely on:
(1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded on a reliable scien-
tific methodology that gives it the capacity to accurately analyze evidence and report
findings and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline
rely on human interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the
absence of sound operational procedures and robust performance standards.155
146 See Jackman, supra note 68.
147 Id.
148 See Waters, supra note 8.
149 See Jackman, supra note 68.
150 NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 84, at 1.
151 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009).
152 NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 84, at 85-86.
153 See id. at 127-28.
154 See id. at 52-53.  The NAS report explores various disciplines in forensic science, such
as biological evidence (DNA analysis), friction ridge analysis (fingerprints, palm prints, and
sole prints), and impression evidence (shoeprints and tire tracks). See id. at 127-50.  How-
ever, this Note does not endeavor to explain the validity of using live two-way video testi-
mony for any discipline other than chemical analysis.
155 Id. at 87.
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Analysts commonly conduct chemical analysis to determine substances in
the form of powders, smokeable or injectable material, tablets, capsules, and
plant materials.156  Although other forms of forensic science are more sensitive,
and likely require complex analyst testimony (or even expert testimony) in
order to explain the findings, forensic scientists analyze chemical substances
using widely recognized, standard protocols.157  Thus, this Note only addresses
the reliability of two-way video testimony for analysts’ testimony involving
chemical analysis.
The NAS report does not specifically address the necessity of live testi-
mony from analysts in court to corroborate laboratory reports for chemical
analysis.  Instead, the NAS report was primarily concerned with the validity
and accuracy of forensic science laboratory reports, and called for higher stan-
dards for the use of forensic science reports.158  The NAS report aimed to limit
the risks involved with depending on certain forensic science methodologies
that have not been proven to be completely accurate, and to eliminate wrongful
convictions that were made in reliance on forensic science.159  In particular,
one of the research council’s recommendations was to develop model labora-
tory reports that delineate the minimum information a report should include.160
In explaining the various downfalls of admitting forensic science in litiga-
tion, the NAS report states “the legal system is ill-equipped to correct the
problems of the forensic science community.”161  Some forensic science disci-
plines have not been able to validate their approaches or establish the accuracy
of their findings, and court are limited in addressing these issues due to “the
rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards
governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the adver-
sary process, and the common lack of scientific expertise among judges and
lawyers who must try to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence.”162
The NAS report further admits that superior resources must be used in
order to improve the reliability of forensic science.163  However, it is not the
responsibility of the legal system to correct the errors of forensic science.  The
NAS report acknowledges that the source of problems in forensic science is
contained within the scientific community itself.164  Therefore, the resolution
of such issues should not be imposed on the legal system, but resolved sepa-
rately within the field of forensic science.
The Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee that requires courts to
properly evaluate evidence for reliability though a particular process.165  The
Melendez-Diaz Court maintained that requiring analyst testimony ensures that
156 Id. at 134.
157 Id.
158 See id. at 53.
159 See id. at 45, 85-86.
160 See id. at 189-90.
161 Id. at 53.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004)).
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courts have sufficiently assessed evidence through cross-examination.166  How-
ever, as the dissent points out, “The Confrontation Clause is not designed, and
does not serve, to detect errors in scientific tests.”167  The scientific community
must resolve errors in lab reports before submitting the reports as evidence.
Thus, allowing an analyst to testify via two-way videoconferencing sufficiently
ensures that a lab report was produced accurately to the best of an analyst’s
knowledge, which is the most that the Confrontation Clause can ask of an ana-
lyst.  Physical, in-person testimony is not necessary for an analyst to confirm
that she conducted chemical analysis under proper protocol.  In fact, the NAS
report states that chemical analysis is fundamentally dependable, and there is
“adequate understanding of the uncertainties and potential errors.”168  Because
a lab analyst did not witness any acts, and is far removed from a defendant,
cross-examination via two-way video testimony provides adequate confronta-
tion between an analyst and a defendant.
The NAS report also notes that fraudulent lab reporting is uncommon, but
the risk of bias is prevalent.169  However, chemical analysis does not depend on
the cognitive predisposition of a lab analyst.170  Human bias is not a character
flaw, but a characteristic of decision-making.171  When an analyst is asked to
compare possibly subjective data, such as hair, shoeprints, or fingerprints, the
risk of cognitive bias is magnified.172  Chemical analysis relies on standard
protocols and procedures to determine the composition of a substance, and only
requires objective analysis.173  Thus, most inconsistencies can be discovered
through comprehensive cross-examination using two-way videoconferencing.
Indeed, any inconsistencies in laboratory findings that cannot be discovered
through cross-examination via two-way videoconferencing likely cannot be dis-
covered through physical, in-court testimony.
Finally, the NAS report advocates enhanced standards for reporting
results.174  With regard to courtroom testimony based on forensic science
reporting, however, the NAS report only calls for the usage of “lay terms” so
that the judge or jury may properly weigh and interpret the testimony.175
Because analysts can adequately explain lab reports in lay terms via two-way
videoconferencing, and such explanations would not be any different if the ana-
lyst physically appears in court, two-way video testimony is acceptable.
C. Current Usage of Two-Way Video Testimony
Many states already employ, or are considering, the usage of two-way
videoconferencing in courts.176  Videoconferencing technology decreases the
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168 NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 84, at 135.
169 Id. at 45.
170 See id. at 122.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 123.
173 See id. at 121-23.
174 Id. at 185-86.
175 Id.
176 See Justin Lazenby, Video-Testimony Equipment Helping Forensic Scientists in Court
and the Lab, OR. ST. POLICE (Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/NEWSRL/news/
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backlog of cases requiring chemical analysis,177 and forensic laboratories that
utilize two-way videoconferencing have noticed improvements in their ability
to provide valuable scientific analysis to the criminal justice system.178  These
forensic laboratories operate under greater efficiency, asserting, “Time not
spent on the road means time spent in the lab doing crucial analytical work
needed for other investigations.”179
For example, in one drunk-driving trial, a forensic science office was able
to save approximately forty-six hours of analyst bench time, in addition to
avoiding the costs associated with travel.180  Analysts are able to walk down
the hall from their laboratory, spend some time testifying over videoconferenc-
ing, and then promptly return to their work in the laboratory without spending
hours on transportation.181  In fact, using videoconferencing systems, analysts
are able to efficiently schedule several testimonies with different courts all on
the same day,182 illustrating that videoconferencing facilitates a vast improve-
ment in efficiency and greatly increases work production.
One prosecutor noted that with the usage of adequate audio and visual
technology, testimony given over a videoconferencing system seems virtually
equivalent to a person being physically present at trial.183  Even a judge stated
that videoconferencing does not adversely affect witness testimony, encourag-
ing both prosecutors and defense attorneys alike to agree to its
implementation.184
Although implementing the videoconferencing system poses technological
issues, these matters can be addressed by carefully scrutinizing the video qual-
ity and reliability of the equipment being used.  Courtrooms have taken advan-
tage of technological advancements to improve court proceedings, and are
increasingly considered “high-tech.”185  Courts must strive to resolve disputes
as quickly as possible, and, for the sake of efficiency, they must do so using
minimal human and financial resources.186  The legal community has generally
accepted and approved of the use of technology for the purpose of trial effi-
ciency,187 but courts must consider the quality of the videoconferencing tech-
02_14_2008_lab_video_testimony.shtml; In Michigan, Forensics Experts Testify Using
Polycom Telepresence, POLYCOM (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.polycom.com/global/docu-
ments/company/customer_success_stories/government/cs_michigan_state_police.pdf [here-
inafter POLYCOM]; Ron Wood, Washington County Circuit Court: Crime Lab Link Used
More, NWA ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.nwaonline.com/news/2009/nov/09/wash-
ington-county-circuit-court-crime-lab-link-use/.
177 Waters, supra note 8.
178 See Lazenby, supra note 176.
179 Id.
180 See POLYCOM , supra note 176.
181 See Wood, supra note 176.
182 Waters, supra note 8.
183 See POLYCOM, supra note 176.
184 Wood, supra note 176.
185 Fredric I. Lederer, Technology-Augmented Courtrooms: Progress Amid a Few Compli-
cations, or the Problematic Interrelationship Between Court and Counsel, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 675, 675 (2005).
186 Id. at 681.
187 Id. at 676.
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nology and set standards for its use.188  The judge, jury, defense, and
prosecution must be able to clearly observe the live cross-examination of the
analyst for both audio and visual purposes.  As the gatekeepers to evidence,
judges should determine whether the videoconferencing technology utilized in
a courtroom is adequate, because inadequate equipment might violate the
defendant’s right to confrontation.  If the analysts’ testimony is not observable
in a clear manner, the court should render the testimony inadmissible, and the
use of live two-way videoconferencing would be nullified.
Implementing new technology also poses financial issues due to the costs
of the technology.  The use of two-way videoconferencing technology requires
the purchase of cameras, computers, monitors, carts, installation, training, and
shipping.189  In 2008, the cost for a technologically adequate unit cost approxi-
mately $11,000 per unit.190  However, the money saved from not requiring ana-
lysts to testify in court when they could be working in laboratories offsets the
costs of implementing the technology.191  Using videoconferencing technology
has resulted in overall savings of about $1,100 per testimony,192 and some
states have funded the purchase of the technology through specific grants.193
Given the time saved and the increased efficiency of analysts’ work product,
the results of implementing two-way conferencing outweigh the costs of imple-
menting the technology.
D. The Use of Two-Way Live Video for Analysts’ Testimony Satisfies the
Confrontation Clause
The use of two-way live video for analyst testimony pertaining to chemi-
cal analysis upholds the Confrontation Clause under both the Crawford and the
Craig tests.194  It also provides a more thorough treatment for non-physical
testimony than hearsay exceptions, and either the Crawford or Craig tests.195
In fact, the brief of amici law professors in Melendez-Diaz endorses the use of
video technology for analyst testimony.196  Furthermore, many states already
have had great success with the usage of two-way videoconferencing for testi-
fying in court.197  The use of two-way video for analysts’ testimony regarding
chemical analysis is appropriate and reliable for confirming laboratory reports
on chemical analysis.
188 Cf. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that courts must consider the adequacy of the technology).
189 See Lazenby, supra note 176.
190 Id.
191 See infra notes 224-26.
192 Waters, supra note 8.
193 See Lazenby, supra note 176; Wood, supra note 176.
194 See Olson, supra note 27, at 1689.
195 See id.
196 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 143, at
16-17.
197 See Lazenby, supra note 176; POLYCOM, supra note 176; Wood, supra note 176.
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1. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Not Only Satisfies the Crawford
Test, but Is More Comprehensive
The Crawford test for testimonial statements does not allow a defendant to
cross-examine an adverse witness in the presence of a judge or jury contempo-
raneously at trial because Crawford only requires: (1) that a witness is unavail-
able, and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.198  The keyword is “prior”—whereas Crawford allows for prior testi-
mony to be introduced in court, two-way videoconferencing enables live testi-
mony.  By utilizing two-way videoconferencing, a defendant can cross-
examine a lab analyst while being observed by a jury during the defendant’s
actual trial.  Two-way videoconferencing allows full observation from the
judge and jury, and ensures the defense can cross-examine an analyst before a
trier of fact.199  The Supreme Court maintains that an accused “should never
lose the benefit of any of these safeguards,”200 and two-way videoconferencing
protects the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants at trial.
Moreover, two-way videoconferencing fulfills the standards set forth by
Crawford.  The Crawford test evaluates the use of former testimony from an
unavailable witness given prior to trial by inquiring whether the defense had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.201  In Crawford, the Court was
fundamentally concerned with the defendant’s right to cross-examine the wit-
ness, stating, “Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of]
witnesses, and generally before the triers of fact in question . . . . [w]ritten
evidence . . . [is] almost useless . . . .”202  The Court held that any evidence that
is “testimonial” in nature must survive the scrutiny of the Confrontation
Clause.203  In light of the Crawford holding, the Melendez-Diaz court decided
that the problem with forensic lab reports is that when an analyst signs the
report as an affidavit, the report is clearly testimonial in nature.204  Justice
Scalia explained that by stating a tested substance is cocaine and setting forth
its weight, the analysts’ affidavits are “the precise testimony the analysts would
be expected to provide if called at trial.”205  In turn, the lab certificates are
functionally identical to live, in-court testimony doing “‘precisely what a wit-
ness does on direct examination.’”206
Two-way videoconferencing upholds the safeguards that the Supreme
Court has established because it allows both contemporaneous testimony and
cross-examination, where the defendant can immediately confront the lab ana-
lyst.  Furthermore, using two-way video conferencing, the analyst’s statements
are heard in court instantaneously.207  Although the analyst is not physically in
198 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
199 See Harmon, supra note 106, at 161.
200 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
201 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39-40.  The wife’s testimony given prior to trial was not
permitted for use at trial because the wife was unavailable for cross-examination.
202 Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
203 Id. at 68.
204 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2427, 2532 (2009).
205 Id.
206 Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
207 See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006).
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court, those in the courtroom can observe the live cross-examination to con-
sider the analyst’s credibility.208
In Crawford, the Court essentially contemplated that some out-of-court
statements become admissible if the witness is unavailable.209  It is arguable
that due to the high demand and low supply of analysts in laboratories, in many
instances, these analysts are in fact unavailable.  There are simply not enough
analysts to testify in numerous hearings while continuing to perform analysis in
laboratories.  Two-way video testimony enables analysts to spend more time in
a laboratory performing analysis, rather than commuting to court.  Also, ana-
lysts would be able to continue performing their duties in a laboratory until
they are actually called to give live testimony, rather than waiting at a court-
house to be called into court.  Under the Crawford test, if former testimony that
has undergone cross-examination satisfies the Confrontation Clause, then two-
way video testimony that allows a defendant to actually cross-examine a lab
analyst “in court” via live videoconferencing should be permitted.
2. The Relevancy of the Craig Test
Although Craig was decided prior to Crawford and the confrontation
issues were addressed under the now defunct “reliability” test,210 the reasoning
in Craig is still pertinent because, in Craig, the child witnesses were effectively
unavailable to testify in court.  Laboratory analysts are similarly unavailable to
testify in court, and two-way video testimony is much more comprehensive
than the one-way video testimony permitted by Craig. Even when both Craig
and Crawford are considered, two-way video testimony satisfies Confrontation
Clause requirements.
The Craig test addresses one-way video testimony, requiring its usage to
be necessary to further an important policy, and for the testimony to be suffi-
ciently reliable.211  Allowing two-way video testimony is necessary to further
several important policies.  Two-way video testimony ensures a speedy trial,212
while allowing prosecutors to build their cases adequately.  Requiring analysts
to testify at every trial that utilizes a laboratory report causes significant
delays,213 and if a defendant is not afforded his right to a speedy trial, charges
against the defendant might be dismissed without prejudice.214  Two-way video
testimony also enables prosecutors to uphold the success of the criminal justice
system without encountering great budgetary restrictions and time constraints.
Finally, two-way video testimony is reliable because unlike one-way video tes-
timony, where the defendant can see and hear the witness but the witness can-
208 Id.
209 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
210 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
211 See id. at 850.
212 See Jackman, supra note 68. The right to a speedy trial is addressed as a problem for
the prosecution when lab analysts are not immediately available to testify.
213 See Attorneys Ass’n Amici Brief, supra note 1, at 15-16 (describing three ways in which
the right to a speedy trial may be delayed: (1) delays due to court scheduling, which may
result in hours and days of wait time for analysts to testify; (2) delays due to the laboratory
analysts’ workload within the laboratories to issue certificates, and (3) delays due to the
volume of drug cases that would require analysts to appear in multiple courts in many cities).
214 Id. at 17.
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not see or hear the defendant,215 two-way video testimony allows full
confrontational access between the witness and the defendant.216
The Court in Melendez-Diaz stressed the importance of confrontation to
“weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well,”217
but two-way video conferencing allows for “in-court” testimony that still pro-
vides face-to-face adversarial questioning, albeit in two-dimensional form.218
As the Court suggested in Craig, witnesses are less likely to lie when con-
fronted in the courtroom.219  Yet, because the Court found that one-way vide-
oconferencing provided adequate testimony even in the absence of actual in-
person confrontation,220 two-way videoconferencing is even more thorough
because it allows for cross-examination and two-way interaction.  In Melendez-
Diaz, the Court asserted its expectation for an analyst who has produced false
results to reconsider his testimony when in view of the defendant.221  While
two-way video testimony is a remote interaction, the method nevertheless
allows an analyst to view a defendant and to succumb to the pressure of testify-
ing truthfully under oath.
3. The Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae In Support of
Petitioner Establishes that Video Technology Satisfies the
Confrontation Clause
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered the opinions of a group of amici
law professors who provided input on the confrontation issues involved in the
case.222  In their brief to the Court, the professors supported requiring analyst
testimony under the Confrontation Clause.223  However, they also suggested
that prosecutors may use video technology as a means for providing analyst
testimony, in order to lessen the prosecutors’ burden.224  The brief noted that
the use of one-way closed circuit television “[s]howcas[es] a witness’s tone of
voice, facial expressions, and general demeanor. . . . [and u]nlike transcripts,
the video image captures body language, eye contact, and affect—factors that
juries evaluate when considering the reliability of testimony.”225  In turn, the
amici law professors believe that the use of video technology would provide all
the crucial information the framers of the Constitution valued when they cre-
ated the Confrontation Clause, and that its usage is a suitable replacement for
in-court testimony.226
215 Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-42.
216 See Harmon, supra note 106, at 161.
217 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz has further defined a defendant’s
right to confrontation at trial.  Regardless whether prosecutors agree with the
Court’s ruling, they must move forward in a manner that best sustains their
endeavors while complying with the Court’s decision.  Although physical con-
frontation before a trier of fact is ideal, courts have consistently made excep-
tions to this requirement, and another exception should be made for analysts’
testimony.  Doing so would alleviate the overwhelming burden on the prosecu-
tion of logistically and financially providing analyst testimony in court.  Apply-
ing the Confrontation Clause in an overly restrictive manner strongly inhibits, if
not destroys, the state’s ability to pursue many cases involving chemical analy-
sis.  Although prosecutorial efficiency is not above the constitutional rights of
our criminal justice system, courts should consider the legitimate goals and
realistic capabilities of law enforcement and not allow guilty defendants to cir-
cumvent the law due to the prosecution’s restricted resources.
The use of live two-way videoconferencing allows prosecutors to fulfill
the goal of maintaining effective prosecutions of criminal cases without violat-
ing rights afforded to defendants by the Constitution.  The Court’s requirement
of live analyst testimony imposes a greater burden upon the prosecution and its
available resources, but technological advancements serve to mitigate the prob-
lem.  In turn, prosecutors should be permitted to take advantage of such tech-
nologies in order to maintain an effective criminal justice system.
Employing two-way live videoconferencing for analyst testimony regard-
ing chemical analysis meets the demands of the Confrontation Clause, as set
forth by the Court in Melendez-Diaz.  Indeed, the use of two-way live vide-
oconferencing better fulfills the Confrontation Clause than the Crawford and
Craig tests.  Moreover, using videoconferencing technology, laboratory ana-
lysts are able to appear in court to testify without spending many hours—hours
that could be spent working in laboratories on cases—traveling to court.
Finally, the use of live two-way videoconferencing is interactive and effective;
analysts are still able to provide testimony under oath and the defense counsel
can cross-examine an analyst in the presence of a jury.  Live two-way vide-
oconferencing fulfills all the elements the Supreme Court has established for
meeting the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.  Allowing analysts to
impart testimony via live two-way videoconferencing will effectively reconcile
the ruling in Melendez-Diaz with the prosecutors’ dilemma.
